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1. In the frameworks of the Austro-Hungarian Empire the Hungarian public law 
literature, which has developed during the XIXth century, dealt quite a lot with the question 
of constitutional guarantees. The "Hungarian Law Lexicon" published at the end of the 
century (1898) has summarized the genenally accepted views. The terms published in this 
volume shows that in this period the sphere of constitutional guarantees was interpereted 
in quite a wide sense. Namely all those institutions "whose aim is to secure the existence 
of the constitution and impede the infringement and illegal modification of it "belong to 
the sphere of constitutional guarantees. These are the constitutional guarantees. Such gua-
rantees were the right to resist in the old Hungarian and English constitutions assured by 
the Golden Bull of 1222 and the Magna Charta of England (1215), respectively. Moreover 
this aim was served by the letters of pledge and oaths of the heads of states, the ministe-
rial responsibility, the people's representation, the budget rights, the right of taxation and 
recruiting, the freedom of the press, the right of publicity and free discussion, the right 
to complain and appeal, the juridicial independence, the irremovability of the judges, the 
oath of the military to the constitution, the more free and independent self-governments". 
Not much later in the time of the first great constitutional crisis of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy (when the monarch has refused to appoint the majority party won at the electi-
on to form the government), a valuable book has been published on the constitutional 
guarantees.1 The volume overlooks the whole domestic and foreign literature of this subject, 
at the same time it criticizes the so-called dogmatic opinion of the earlier period, which has 
thought that by listing certain law institutions the real existence of constitutional gua-
rantees was proved. Instead this volume has aimed such a "functional" categorisation of 
the constitutional guarantees, which indicates the actual purpose of constitutional gua-
rantees, namely to exclude the establishment of some kind ofabsolute royal power or dicta-
torship in the formally maintained framework of constitution and law (p. 18.). It has con-
sidered especially important the really existing and functioning constitutional guarantees 
among such conditions when the organisation or organisations possessing the state power 
"are standing under outer pressure, or when this axis of state power is guided by much 
stronger outside factors beyond the borders of the country", (p. 41.) Finally it regards the 
constitutional court as such tool which is able to give an appropriate guarantee for the 
concrete prevalence of the institutional guarantees of constitution. (In the given period the 
constitutional crisis has been finished by a compromise, therefore the establishment of 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court has not occurred.) 
However the Hungarian public law literature between the two world wars has relatively 
frequently dealt with the problem of constitutional quarantees. We might say to the favour 
of the Hungarian scholars of public law that they have referred the particular role of consti-
1 Imre, Szivák: On the constitutional guarantees. Budapest, 1906: p. 176. 
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tutional quarantees just against those foreign influences, which have tried to destroy the 
values of constitutionality by citing the German and Italian examples. 
So, for instance Móricz Tomcsányi in his university textbook published in 1942 deter-
mined the guarantees of constitution starting from the category of constitutionality. He 
examines the constitutionality from two sides, namely from the relation of the main state 
organs to each other (their constitutionally established and real situation), and from the side 
of the freedom rights of individuals. Right on this field he determines the constitutional 
guarantees. Accordingly this view regards constitutional state and constitutionality such a 
state order, where "the private and political liberty of citizens are secured and related to these 
rights those institutions are regarded constitutional guarantees, which ensure the mentioned 
liberty of citizens towards the state power (king, ministry) against their occasional trans-
gressions". He considers important to circumscribe precisely these constitutional guarantees 
and for its sake returns to the emphasis of the importance of those institutions which were 
regarded and recognized as constitutional guarantees at the end of the XIXth century. 
Consequently according to the Hungarian Constitution the most significant constitutional 
guarantees are "particularly the coronation (royal letter of pledge and oath), the ministe-
rial responsibility, the budgetary rights of the Parliament, the judicial independence, the 
freedom of the press etc."2 
However, Tomcsányi's views are built on the statements of Hauriou or at least similar 
to the viewpoint of Hauriou concerning the constitutional guarantees. 
He identifies the constitutional guarantees as such tools, which provide protection for 
the individual citizen in case of threat against his freedom rights. He says that the freedoms 
of the individual can be threatened from two sides, namely from the state power and from 
other individuals. The function of the constitutional guarantees is to protect the freedoms of 
individuals against the state. The dangers appearing from the individuals are diverted by 
the mutuality of rights which the individuals are entitled to by itself. 
Consequently the basis of constitutional guarantees is the structure, construction of the 
government itself, first of all the division and balance of the power branches, the division 
of power and the application of such checks and balances, which make possible the "mod-
eration" of each power, starting from the fundamental principle already known by Montes-
quieu, that the power can be moderated only by another power. Hauriou also understands 
that among the conditions of the XXth century the classic division of power went through 
important modifications. He mentions several examples as such phenomena which were not 
considered by the classic division of power, however these phenomena may mean significant 
danger for the individual liberty in the practice. Among the examples he mentions the 
blending of civil and military power and emphasizes that the military police with „order-
keeping" character and its oppressiveness is quite different to the civil police and oppression 
as far as "harshness and brutality"-are concerned. Moreover he call the attention to the 
fact that in case of crises and troubles there is an inclination to emphasize such characteris-
tics of the division of power, which may weaken the effectivity of the governmental activities. 
Therefore such concentration of powers is stressed which render the classic constitutional 
guarantees insignificant in the obstruction of the appearing tyranny.3 
We can continue the references from the literature, which all would prove according 
to the earlier public law literature that the classic constitutional guarantees first of all are 
ready to serve the protection of individual rights against the transgressions of state organs, 
against the illegal acts of the authorities. These guarantees have obviously their importance 
even today. However we should not neglect the fact that in the period following the Second 
! Móricz, Tomcsányi: The public law of Hungary. IVth edition. Budapest, 1942. p. 48. 
3 Hauriou, Maurice .- .Précis du droit constitutionnel. II. Edition. Paris, 1929. p. 702 et al. 
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World War the active role of the state got more and more in the foreground, especially 
in securing the political, economic, cultural and social rights of the individual. Parallel with 
the extent of transformation of the constitutional "Rechtsstaat" in its classical meaning 
to social constitutional state the whole system of it went through significant changes indeed. 
Among the constitutional guarantees those institutions and organisations have acquired 
greater and greater role, which are able to harmonize the activities of state organs with the 
constitutional requirements expressing the characteristic features of a democratic social 
constitutional state. The Constitutional Law Council (respectively the similar entities) and 
the constitutional court belong to them. 
2. Both the Constitutional Law Council and the Constitutional Court take place among 
the organisational guarantees of the protection of constitutionality. We might say that 
these are special institutions for the protection of constitution and as such cannot be listed 
among the classic and recognized types of state organs. Namely they are neither legislative 
organs, nor representative organs, they are not organs of the executive branch or public 
administration (in this place we would not consider these two terms as having identical 
contents). Moreover they cannot be listed among the organs of judicial power either, which 
implements the functions of justice in their classical meaning. We might say that the Consti-
tutional Law Council and the Constitutional Court are special state organs serving the 
primacy of the constitution with legal measures and as such they embody a separate type 
of state organs. I presume that the emergence and consolidation of this new type of organs 
has at least as much epoch-making importance from the aspect of the historical development 
of the law system as the creation of the system of the contemporary representative organs 
in its time. Therefore e.g. today it is more and more clear that in our days the Constitutional 
Law Council and the Constitutional Court are essential tools of the mechanism of legislation, 
at least in those modern and developed countries where the state have to provide the more 
and more growing and different services for the citizens. 
The Constitutional Law Council and the Constitutional Court as new type institutions 
— separately from the social system of the states—are such social values, which significantly 
contribute to the legal culture and in the same time the indispensable parts of the legal 
technique as well. It comes from the mentioned facts that the Constitutional Law Council 
and Constitutional Court possess several common features and functions and on these 
common grounds they can be examined jointly among the organisational guarantees of the 
protection of constitution. It is another question whether these institutions or their relation 
to each other can be evaluated separately from the system of the given state or its political 
order. Followingly it can be doubted too whether the Constitutional Law Council and the 
Constitutional Court should be compared at all, is it possible to set up priority between the 
two: whether we can say that the Constitutional Court is superior from the point of 
view the organisational guarantees of constitutionality than the Constitutional Law 
Council. It may happen that based upon the whole legal culture of some given countries the 
Constitutional Law Council is much more effective tool the protection of constitutionality 
than the Constitutional Court in another country. However the experiences of comparative 
law surveys lead us to the consequence that today we can say with some theoretical base 
that generally the institution of the Constitutional Court creates wider framework for the 
protection of constitutionality than the Constitutional Law Council. It is also true that 
ultimately the emphasis is not only on the name alone. We can not even exclude that in 
some cases the organs named Constitutional Law Council (Constitutional Council, Consti-
tutional Committee) actually fulfills the functions of the Constitutional Court. 
It also should not be ignored that the different concepts of constitution also may influence 
the evaulation of the Constitutional Law Council and the Constitutional Court. 
It is well-know that in the course of historical development two contradicting constitu-
8 Antalffy 1 1 ~ 
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tional concepts have appeared. One of these concepts treats the constitution primarily as à 
political document instead of law regulation. Accordingly, several elements of the Constitu-
tion have legal character, but the Constitution is still much more a political program. 
Therefore it is not matter of interest for those applying the law, but the legislator. In other 
words it is such a political program, which virtually orientates the legislative organs which 
are authorized to implement the Constitution. 
On the contrary, the other concept albeit recognizes the powerful political content 
of the Constitution, however, it puts the emphasis rather more on the legal character and 
features of the Constitution. This concept surveys the Constitution primarily as a law regu-
lation to be applied directly (or mostly can be applied directly). 
3. Both concepts can be found already at the cradle of constitutions. It is well known e.g. 
that in the course of the English revolution of the XVIIth century the "Agreement of the 
People" which is viewed as an ansector of the written constitutions, a kind of declaration, 
was considered more as a political program, than a directly applicable law regulation. 
Although after a significant amendment this document was submitted to the Parliament, 
where it was debated and adopted. However, the "Agreement of the People" did not become 
a formal law. Simply because the leadership of this revolution regarded it as such a political 
program, which should be implemented in practice by separate legal rules, laws which are 
adopted by the Parliament. Such laws implementing the "Agreement of the People" were 
the laws on the abolishment of the monarchy and the declaration of the republic. 
In the course of the preparation of the first Constitution of the French revolution there 
were debates early in the sessions of the National Assembly, later in the sessions of the 
Constituent National Assembly, where also the different versions of these two constitutional 
concepts competed with each other. Among the representatives of the National Assembly 
there were several such member who although supported the preparation and enactment 
of the Constitution, but they did not expect anything new of it. Only for the sake the con-
solidation of legal security they would have preferred the codification of the valid feudal 
public law (i.e. to put it in a comprehensive legal text). Namely the customary law rules of the 
feudal public law lived in a very ambivalent and uncertain way in the public common 
knowledge. Actually these representatives did not want any renewal. They intended merely 
to put the "basic law" (lex fundamentalis, loi fondamentale) in a comprehensive form — 
which actually was known in the feudal legal order .too — they wanted to confirm it by 
the National Assembly, in other words confirm the existing old governmental order. Only 
in the course of the debate on the draft of the "Declaration on the rights of man and citizen" 
became clear that among the representatives the followers of the new political system possess 
an overwhelming majority. They voted for the inclusion of the declaration of rights into the 
constitution. However, even the followers of the declaration had such basic ideas in mind 
which later should have been translated to the language of the everyday legal practice by 
separate laws later on. We know such a proposal too, which, for the sake that the people 
should not misinterpret the principles of the declaration generally, intended to treat the 
declaration as a document of "confidential" nature. They proposed that it should not be 
made public. It is enough if the legislators know its contents. Anyway, it is the task of the 
representatives to prepare the laws necessary to the practical realisation of the declaration. 
"Conservons les principles pour nous, qui faisoê les lois et hâtons nous de donner aux 
autres les consequences, qui sont les lois elles mêmes" — we can read in the protocols 
of the Constituent National Assembly.3'3 Afterwards in France they had treated the frequ-
3/a Comp.: Archives Parlamentaires de 1787 a 1860. Paris, 1875. Diary of the Constitutional 
National Assembly, August 1,1789. 
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ently changing written constitutions in the course of decades as they rather contain 
beautifully written philosophical concepts, than actual law regulations. 
In France almost four decades were necessary that the doctrinaires make the legal 
character of the constitution and constitutional law recognized as a result of the revolution-
ary movement fought with the slogan of the "constitutionality". Perhaps it is not insigni-
ficant if we here also refer to the fact that the doctrinaires had a periodical, which took the 
lion's share in the preparation of the revolution of 1830 and it was titled the "Constitution-^ 
nel". Submitted by Minister of Cultural Affairs Guizot, the King has signed in August 22,1834 
the decree, which gave the authorization to set up a department of constitutional law at the 
Law Faculty of the Paris University. The proposal of Guizot has mentioned not only the 
subject sphere of the new discipline to be taught, but in a certain way the methods of its 
scientific activities as well. We may say that in this proposal there is a comprehensive 
program of the development of public law science and the constitutional law as actual 
law. Therefore now we quote the referring part of the proposal in its totality. "The 
object and method of this discipline is determined by the name of the object itself ; namely 
the Constitution, the scientific expression of those personal guarantees and political insti-
tutions which are sanctioned by the Constitution. For us this matter is not merely philo-
sophical system, which should be determined by the disputes between men, even more it is 
a written and clear law, which can be and should be expressed and interpreted as the Civil 
Code or any other part of the legislature. Not only such a discipline which is far-sighted and 
appropriate in the same time, which is based on the public law of the nation and the moral 
of history, but is suitable to improve by comparison and through the analogies with abroad, 
only this can replace the mistakes of ignorance and audacity of superficial knowledge with 
substantial and concrete (positive) material of knowledge." 3 /b 
Between the first Constitution of the French revolution and the emergence of independ-
ent constitutional law sciences the more than four decades have contributed to the enrich-
ment of the idea of constitution significantly on other ways too. At this time they realized 
that the terms of constitution and charter-type constitution are not identical. That state 
also has a constitution where the most important rules of public law, such as the participa-1 
tion of citizens in the practice of power, the most significant guarantees of the citizens' 
freedom accepted separately in the course of historical development are transformed to 
written law. Bemjamin Constant was forced as early as in 1814 to prove that England also 
possess a constitution, although the most profund items are not collected in one single 
document. "Against those who permanently repeat that England does not have a constitution 
and despite of it lives happily, I have to say that England does have a constitution, because 
it possess Habeas Corpus, Bill of Rights, Magna Charta (though it is not applicable in its 
ancient form); the English nation has representative system, jury courts And so on."3/c 
Benjamin Constant does not merely emphasized the analogies between the Continental 
and Anglo-Saxon models of public law after the French revolution, but at the same time he 
emphasized a certain continuity of the development of public law. Namely it is .well known 
3/b "L'objet et la forme cet enseignement sont détermines par son titre même; c'est l'expo-
sition de la Charte et des garanties individuelles comme des institutions politiques qu'elle consacre. 
Ce n'est plus la pour nous un simple systeme philosophique livre aux disputes des hommes; c'est 
une loi ecrite, reconnue, qui pent et droit être explique commentés aussi bien que la loi civile ou 
toute autre partie de notre législation. Un tel enseignement, à la fois vaste et précis, fondé sur le 
droit public national et sur les leçons de l'histoire, suspectible de s'etendre par les comparaisons et 
les analogies entrangères, doit substituer aux erreurs de l'ignorance et a la témérité des notions 
superficielles, des connaissances fortes et positives." (See: Pellegrino Rossi: Cours de droit Constitu-
tionnel. Paris, 1866. p. V.) 
?/c Reflexions sur les constitutions et les garanties, publiés le mai 24, 1814. See: Cours.de 
politique constitutionelle, Paris, 1872. Volume I. p. 265. 
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that the continental public law science — even before the French revolution — had stressed 
the importance of basic laws, namely written basic laws summarizing the most important 
rules of public law. Already in 1749 Achenwall wrote that the public law of a state can be 
learned the best way from its basic laws. Their origin, development and actual existence 
should be examined. Though the basic laws may contain some common law elements, but if 
in a state only unwritten law can be found in the field of public law, one can very safely get 
to the consequence that in such a state the arbitrary will of the monarch is the only basic law.4 
The effort for continuity can be recognized in other statements of Constant in a very in-
teresting way. For example, in his proposals aiming — at the improvement of the Constitution 
he aspired to construct such a separate and neutral power branch, which is able to guard 
with impartiality the balance of power branches, the maintenance of Constitution. (It is 
known that Constant generally divided the state organisation sometimes to five, other times 
even six different branches.) Finally Constant had seemed to find the requested neutral 
power in the head of state, to put it more precisely in the constitutional monarch of the given 
time. This constitutional king should have played a virtually passive role all the time. Almost 
all of his activity would be confined to fulfill the functions of supervisions, the safeguarding 
the constitutionality by rather broad control functions. It is easy to recognize that such a 
constitutionality control does not show any similarity to the activities of the pre-revolution-
ary French parliaments. (However, the parliaments also examined the "constitutionality" 
of the royal decrees, respectively their conformity, with the feudal basic laws — theoretically 
as the successor of the officers of the former royal court.) But it cannot be connected to the 
Senate of the VIIIth year either, because this institution as a whole stayed out of the legis-
lative system, it might survey the constitutionality of laws upon the suggestion of the author-
ized organs. (Actually even that was not an "original" institution, as only put the draft 
worked out by Sieyes in the third year of revolution into reality.) Even the "constitutional 
monarch" safeguarding the constitutionality had a certain predecessor — mainly in the 
concepts of feudal public law which were generalized and prepared as "ius publicum univer-
sale". This ius publicum universale namely regarded the king not only as a participant in the 
legislative and executive branch, but as the possessor of the supreme power (potestas inspec-
toría), who in such position could examine every acts of the whole state organisation. Even 
the details of the virtually unlimited "potestas inspectoría" were worked out by Martini 
in his work titled "Allgemeine Recht der Staaten."5 
During these years the idea get strengthened that the existence of a written constitution 
is not enough by itself to consider any state a constitutional state. We may talk about consti-
tutional state (today we would talk about constitutionality) only in case the constitution of 
the given state contains the social values required by the age. This requirement is fixed in 
the Article 16 of the Declaration of 1789, when it said: "Such society, where the rights 
are not guaranteed institutionally and the power branches are not divided, does not have 
constitution". However, only after the Vienna Congress, in the course of constituent activités 
,, of.some-German states and the political struggles it became clear that the two camps are 
separated by a whole world: one of them simply put the slogan of "constitution" (Verfassung) 
on its banner, the other did the same with "constitutional constitution" (konstitutionelle 
Verfassung). 
4. Returning to the double concept of "political" and "legal" constitution we have to 
say that for the confrontation of the two concepts a twin concept of constitutionality was 
4 Comp. Gottfried, Achenwall: Abriss der neuesten Staatswissenschaft. Gôttingen, 1749. p. 17. 
5 See: Arthur Balogh: „Benjamin Constant és az alkotmányos állam tana" (Benjamin Constant 
and the concept of constitutional state). Budapest, 1915. In: Essays from the sphere of philosophy 
and social sciences. 1915. p. 205 et al. 
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formed in some historical periods of the constitutional development. One of them was 
regarded as a formal, the other as substantial constitutionality. The constitutionality in its 
formal meaning had expressed the requirement that the acts of the state/including the 
normative and individual acts should not infringe the constitution, i.e. such acts are null 
and void or should not be implemented at all. The constitutionality in substantial meaning 
had meant the implementation of the constitution into practice. This concept did not deny 
either the legal and organisational guarantees as important factors of the formal consti-
tutionality, however, had stressed the importance of the social, economic and political 
means, which could support the implementation of the program contained by the constitution 
to the reality. 
In these days we can ascertain clearly that the legal sciences of the developed countries 
use the term of constitutionality in such a broad meaning, which not merely combine the 
concepts of constitutionality in its formal and substantial meaning (material meaning) but 
at the same time elevates them to a higher level, institutionalize legally their guarantees in a 
very differentiated way. We have to say that today the term of constitutionality expresses 
such a claim to every acts of public power that they should be in conformity with the consti-
tution both in formal and material meaning, as the constitution is the supreme and most 
powerful legal regulation above the whole legal system. It is also true that this constitution-
ality in its broadest sense is identical with the legality in its broades sense, however, the 
legality in this broad meaning already expresses that requirement too that in a constitutional 
state the primacy of constitution should necessarily prevail. 
Based upon the uniformity of constitutionality in its formal and material meaning the 
specific features of the Constitutional Law Council and Constitutional Court make them 
suitable to have place in the mechanism of "checks and balances" of the practice of po-
wer. These specific features are due to the fact that although the activity of those organs 
which are authorized to control the constitutiona lity can be qualified as judical activity 
or even more "jurisdiction" to a certain extent, but actually it goes beyond that point. It con-
tains such elements too, which are alien to the actual judical organs. Nolens, volens — 
willingly, or unwillingly they contain such political considerations which cannot be separa-
ted from the very complex processes going beyond the state organisation which practices 
the public power ensuring the practical implementation of the Constitution. 
We have to admit that in the European legal sciences relatively early time, virtually at 
the beginning of the feudal public law emerging against the developing absolutism (at the 
end of the XVIth century, the beginning of the XVIIth century) that recognition has appeared 
that one should make a sharp distinction between the jurisdiction settling the legal disputes 
of the citizens among them on one hand and the clashes between the citizens and the state 
exercising the public power. We might say that Althusius already in 1603 called the attention 
to the difference between the so-called regular jurisdiction and the public law jurisdiction. 
According to him the jurisdiction has a dual character. Namely, one of them operates be-
tween the magistrate and the subjects, the other in the matters among the subjects. "Est vero 
administratio justitiae duplex. Una fit inter magistratum et subditos. Altera quae fit inter 
subditos et subditos."6 In order to illustrate this point he mentions some historical examples 
as well, among others he refers to the fact that in the Roman times different judges (Judicia 
privata) decided the matters of private persons and other ones (Judicia publica) settled the 
6 Althusius: Politica methodice digesta. Herbornae Nassaviorum 1603. p. 325. Cap. XXIV. 
De sanctiones legum et administratione justitiae. 
affairs of communal character (today we would call them public matters).7 He even takes 
care to calm the powerful saying that his special "public law" jurisdiction does not decrease, 
but strengthen both the respect of the magistrate and the jurisdiction as well. 
This separation of jurisdiction has been accepted by the practice in a rather hard way due 
to some historical reasons. The so-called feudal public law expressing the limits of central 
power took shape in the German Roman Empire, on the ground of controversies between 
the protestant feudal estates and the Catholic emperor.8 In England the prevailing protes-
tantism did not need such separation of public and private law. In some countries of the conti-
nent during the development after the French revolution partly continuing the feudal tradi-
partly considering the French example and the Anglo-American institutions actually at the 
tions, end of the XIXth century or at the beginning of the XXth century, such system of juris-
diction has emerged which in some cases expressed the unity of the judicial organisation 
and power even in the legal disputes between the state and the citizens, in other cases it 
required considers the regular courts and the so-called public law jurisdiction to be separated 
quite distinctly. Parallel with this point the official state mechanism and its diversity got par-
ticularly enlarge and presented more and more variations. This fact has influenced the deve-
lopment of the organisation of jurisdiction as well. In the times between the two world wars 
we could talk not only about public law jurisdiction generally, but a whole system of public 
law courts as well. A very rich constitutional law literature dwells in the categorisation of 
the various types of public law courts and their characteristics features. The substantial work 
by József Szabó titled "Democracy and public law jurisdiction", which was published in 1946, 
deserves extra attention. In this volume he presents not only the European, but the whole inter 
national development process, moreover he surveys the appearance of public law jurisdiction 
and the different kinds of public law courts in each country. Not only due to our common 
past in the history, but while working on the tasks to be done in the future it is useful even 
today to see the informations on the Austrian development. Among the public law courts he 
mentions firstly the public administration court established in 1875. The separate public law 
court was shaped in 1919, the constitutional court (Verfassungsgerichtshof), its basic rules 
were built in the Constitution of 1920. The Austrian Constitution of 1934 has combined the 
constitutional court and the public administration court and strongly restricted the compe-
tence sphere of constitutional jurisdiction. In this narrower sphere, namely in "the remaining 
disputes of constitutional law character" the special senate of the public administration 
court operated (Verfassungssenat). Beyond the above-mentioned Szabó has listed among 
the public law courts the so-called special public law tribunals as e.g. the supreme audit 
office, the patent court, the "agrarian tribunals" (Landes-agrarsenate) which were organised 
in the different provinces to decide in land reform and settlement matters and their appeal 
forum (Oberste-Agrarsenate), furthermore the courts of social security (Versicherungs-
gerichte). We have to mention particularly that a 20-member committee of the National 
Assembly (Nationalversammlung) has also exercised public law jurisdiction. This committee 
had the name Staatsgerichthof.9 Since the re-establishment (re-enactment) of the constitution 
7 „Apud Romanos, judices alii rerum privatorum, alii publicarum, constituti erant. Illorum 
juridicia privata horum publica dicebantur. Ilii vocabuntur judices, arbitri, centumviri, decemviri, 
litibus judicandis et recuperatores. Hi duumviri perduellionis, Populus Romanus comitiis centuriatis, 
curiatis et tributis judicabat de gravissimis negotiis Repub. et regnum totum concernentibus" j 
Althusius. Ibid. p. 329. 
8 About the process of development, including the domestic analoques too. See: István Kovács: 
"Deák 'Adaléka' és a magyar közjog." (Deák "Contributio" and the Hungarian public law.) Post-
script and notes. In: Ferencz Deák: "Adalék a magyar közjoghoz." (Contribution to the Hungarian 
public law.) Budapest, 1987. Reprint edition of the volume published in 1865. 
9 Comp. József Szabó: „Demokrácia és közjogi bíráskodás" (Democracy and public law juris-
diction). Budapest, 1946. p. 131. et al. 
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of 1920 the tasks of the Staatsgerichthof established to decide the. matters of the supreme 
state leaders are judged once again by the constitutional courts. In case we are seeking for 
the categorisation of this public law jurisdiction into the power branches, we could find 
several disputed matters — in the Austrian literature after the Second World War. 
For instance Ermacora mentions three or five great state functions respectively. Starting 
out from formal elements, he distinguishes three state functions (legislation, executive and 
judicial) based on the classical division of power branches. But considering the substance of 
state activities and the claims to be set against the modern state he names five functions. 
These are: the government, the judiciary, the public administration, the economic power 
of the state, furthermore the propaganda and information activities. 
Remaining among the frameworks of the three classic power branches : the judiciary 
includes actually only the regular courts mentioned by the Chapter III of the Austrian 
constitution. According to him those views can be strongly disputed which list the mentioned 
categories of public law jurisdiction, among them the constitutional court, to this category 
(moreover this court was regulated by the Chapter VI separately). The question becomes 
much simpler when ignoring the formal categorisation we count the five mentioned state 
functions according to the substance of the state activities. Accordingly the government 
(Regierung) is the supreme (dominative) leadership of the state affairs. A large segment of 
the activities of constitutional court unambigously belongs to this function sphere.10 
Referring to the latest trends of the public law jurisdiction development, we have to 
tell that one of the most important phenomena in the legal life of the post-war Europe is the 
full accomplishment of the system of the independent constitutional law jurisdiction. How-
ever, this is not a new idea at all. Cappelletti has called the attention to this fact already 
in 1981 while analysing the constitutional court created in the sixties and seventies and the 
increase of their role.11 Cappelletti has also surveyed the cause of this development. Firstly 
he mentions the necessity of the checks against the ever-increasing power of the executive 
organs and the legislation, then he calls attention to the new duties of the state due to the 
implementation of the declarations containing human rights. This obligation require such 
creative jurisdiction and judiciary, which is able to interpret and adapt independently the 
comprehensive international documents and those national laws, which implement them. 
This great task, partly political function cannot be accomplished by the regular courts, 
which very slowly (in the good and the bad meaning of the word) adjust themselves into a 
hierarchical system, and their judges as well. 
Besides, the mechanism of the domestic legislation of the states also more and more get 
differentiated. The increasing role of the international law both in the domestic legislation 
and in the application of law, parallel with this the more and more complex system of do-
mestic law makes the unambiguous determination of the legislative organs and the hierarchy 
of legal regulations more and more difficult. The constitutional law literature after the 
Second World War called the attention to this fact quite frenquently. So for instance Claus 
Stern while summarizing the most important statement about this fact calls the attention 
in the same time that the classical three grade legal order (constitution, Act and decree) 
today does not give satisfactory quideline to the determination of the hierarchy of laws and 
their validity. The international law, the "supranational law rules", obliging certain groups 
of states, the living or relived customary law, the legislative activities of the selfgoverning 
public bodies gaining more and more role, the special legislative authorizations given to the 
10 Comp. Felix Ermacora: Österreichische Verfassungslehre. Wien—Stuttgart, 1970. p. 148. 
et al. 
11 See: Mauro Cappelletti: Nécessité et légitimité de la justice constitutionnelle. Revue Inter-
nationale de droit comparé. 1981. No. 2. p. 625. et al. 
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various State entities, a special "contractual law" appearing in the so-called tariff contracts — 
all these elements make more and more difficult either for the legislator, or especially for the 
applier of the law to categorize unambiguously a legal regulation in that legal system, 
whose basic principle says that legal norm should contradict to another norm stan-
ding on another grade above it. The situation is getting even more complex if we consider that 
in some cases not only the lack of validity but the nullity follows as a consequence of the 
judgement on the validity of law regulations, which draws further consequences, namely 
the ex tunc or ex nunc nullity of the law (Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
Band, Volume I. München, 1977. p. 86.). It is not difficult to understand that these are all 
such circumstances which also require the establishment of a special body at least for the 
consideration of constitutionality and legality of the legislation. 
I guess we have to emphasize a further element, too. I think particularly about the 
changes which took place in France after the Second World War. After the French revolution 
actually until the latest decades such view prevailed that the supreme representative organ 
expressing the national sovereignity cannot be subjected to the control of any narrower 
body, containing politicians appointed to be judges or jurists qualifying as politicans or repre-
sentatives. In the course of the French revolution at first in the session of the Convent at 
July 24, 1795 the proposal had emerged that a control of the acts of legislation should be 
achived through a narrower body in order to ensure the integrity of the constitution. This 
proposal was included in the constitutional draft of Sieyes. However, Sieyes was not a mem-
ber of the constitution-drafting committee of the Convent, but he himself also presented a 
draft of the constitution. The draft was rejected, but its debate has given an opportunity for 
a member of the committee to form the idea, which gave argument in France for the next 
almost 170 years against the creation of every such special organ which would effectively 
control the constitutionality of legislation. "This terrible great power would become almighty 
in the state. With the intention to give a controller to the public power, we would create such 
a master above it, which would put it in chains in order to supervise it even easier." During 
the more than one and half century we heard about three anaemic attempt. One is the Senate 
of the Constitution of the mentioned VIII. Year (December 25, 1799). Its members were 
irreprocheable and independent citizens with great respect indeed. Their tasks and mandate 
were life-long. According to the rules of the constitution itself among the members Sieyes 
got a place too. This body theoretically possessed a very wide competence sphere. It was 
entitled to annul any act of the Tribunate and the government, moreover in the 10 day 
interval between the enactment and the proclamation of the law it could repeal the acts of 
the legislative body too for the reasons of unconstitutionality. However the Senate was so 
adherent to Napoleon that it did not repeal anything on the ground of unconstitutionality 
ever. If it had any objection or contrary opinion against the acts or drafts belonging to its 
competence sphere, it has informed the emperor, who — if he found it necessary — took 
steps to change the objected draft or measure. The direct and cordial relation with the 
imperial power explains why the competence of the Senate was enlargened all the time. For 
example it has received the right to amend the constitution, then to repeal judicial decisions 
in case they have impaired the state security. An amending act of the Senate (senatus consul-
tum) made the Senate the protector of freedoms too. Two committees were created to 
accomplish this function, one of them for the protection of "personal freedoms", the other 
for the protection of the "freedom of the press". These committees have worked too. 585 
arbitrary arrests were reported to the first committee, 14 of them were remedied by the com-
mittee. 8 complaint came in involving press matters, but none of them was decided. 
The proclamation of Napoleon III (January 14, 1852) has repeatedly established the 
. Senate, largely as analogy to the Senate of Napoleon I. With the regime of Napoleon III. 
this Senate also ceased to exist and with it every special institution of the protection of con-
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stitution has disappeared from the French law.12 Afterwards it appears only in the constitu-
tion of 1946, namely a special organ to protect constitutionality, the so-called "Comité 
constitutionnel". The reasons of the estabilishment of this institution, as a political body cons-
tructed according to the political power relations in the composition of the parliament was 
explained as an influence of the traditions of the great revolutionary periods on the French 
public opinion. They would still prefer to have a political body reflecting the composition 
of the parliament than the creation of a special judicial organ or an organ with judicial cha-
racter. However in such period when the need for special organisational guarantees of the 
control of constitutionality have emerged, the failure of the "Comité constitutionnel" has 
documented the inconvenience of this organisational form too — with a theoretical edge. 
It has proved that such political organisation, which is an emanation and mirror image, 
of the parliament, cannot be suitable either for the preliminary, or for the posterior cont-
rol of the constitutionality of laws. According to the nature of things such an organisation — 
instead of analysing and evaluating the legality of an act — necessarily repeats the political 
evaluation of the parliament or in better case it tries to substitute the missed work of the 
parliament by surveying the constitutionality of the laws. But even then it provides politi-
cal and not legal activities. The international literature of constitutional law similarly 
evaluates the role of the "Comité constitutionnel" created by the constitution of 1946.13 
-Meanwhile the "Comité" has brought only one decision during its whole operation. Howe-
ver its activity could be instructive for the determination of the relation of the constituti-
onal law councils responsible to the parliament and the constitutional court to each other 
and their development perspectives as well. 
The constitution of France, adopted in 1958 and still valid, has basically changed the 
needs to be raised to the control of constitutionality and adjusted the organisational guaran-
tees of the control of constitutionality to it. Earlier principally the whole original legislative 
power was based on the parliament, in principle every legislative acts of the executive branch 
was to be created to execute the enacted law by the parliament. According to the new con-
struction the legislative power of the parliament became limited. The parliament is entitled to 
legislative power only in those spheres of subjects which were designed by the constitution. 
Besides its rights could be transferred to the government even in these spheres. In the course of 
the legislative procedure the two houses of parliament, the National Assembly and the Senate 
conducts the dispute on the submitted proposals in the same time. In case of different opinion 
between the two houses the government may initiate a mediation procedure (proposing a 
parity arbitrage commission), afterwards it depends on the standpoint of the National 
Assembly whether it accepts the solutions suggested by the Senate or sticks to the solution 
accepted by the former. Followingly there is such an opinion that in the course of legislative 
procedure "the political weight of the Senate actually depends on the government, moreover 
it can decide whether in a given case the Senate enjoys equal stand with the National Assem-
bly or subjected underneath the National Assembly". Namely if the government does not 
initiate the mediation and the set-up of an ad hoc committee in connection, eventually the 
dispute between the two houses goes on and on without end. 
The legislation and its procedure is furthermore complicated by the fact that the French 
constitutional law today distinguishes several kinds of legislative pieces on the base of 
various-partly formal, partly material, i.e. substantial — characteristics, there are constitu-
tional acts, laws accepted by referendum, laws promulgating international agreements, 
organic laws, financial laws, regular laws. Each type of these laws has a special place in the 
hierarchy of legal sources and even the order of amendment is particular. For instance in. 
12 Comp. Francois Luchaire: Le Consiel Constitutionnel. Paris, 1980. p. 4—5. 
13 Comp. J. Velu—Ph. Quertainmont—M. Leroy: Droit public. Bruxelles, Tom. I. p. 216. 
case of the so-called organic laws (organic laws are such acts which serve the direct applica-
tion or practical adaptation of the constitutional rules referred by the text of the constitution 
itself) the order of dispute and enactment of these law drafts take place in a special way. 
(For their enactment the absolute majority of the parliament members is necessary and con-
cerning these subjects the legislation cannot be delegated.) For the financial laws partly the 
rules referring to the organic laws, partly special procedural rules are to be applied. 
The effort to separate precisely the competence spheres of the executive power and the 
legislative power, the diflerentation between the categories of legal sources and the order 
of procedure concerning legislation, the enlargement of the guarantees of fundamental 
rights have raised considerable new requirements to the control of constitutionality. The 
Constitutional Committee of the IVth Republic could not satisfy the needs of the increased 
expectations. The Constitution of the Vth Republic (1958) by creating the Constitutional 
Council set up a new kind of independent and permanently operating organ for supervising 
the constitutionality. This new organ is not a constitutional court, but neither a parlia-
mentary committee. Its president is one of the foremost personalities of the state, ranking 
directly behind the prime minister. Three of its members are appointed by the president 
of the Republic, three by the National Assembly and three by the president of the Senate 
for 9—9 years. Furthermore, the former presidents of the Republic are also members of this 
body for lifetime. One-third of the members are reelected in every 3 years, therefore it con-
tinously exits. The government members, the parliament representatives, the members of 
economic and social committee (a consultative body of the government), the members of 
the State Council cannot be the members of this body. The members of Constitutional 
Council are obliged to stay away from such public activities which would involve consulta-
tion about matters concerning them, should not take in any leading positions or respon-
sible task in any political party, which would not be compatible considering the obliga-
tion of "discretion" following from their membership in the Constitutional Council. The 
Constitutional Council does not have a general competence sphere, it operates explicity 
in those matters, which are assigned for it by the constitution and the given organic laws, 
more precisely those ones which are assigned by the Council for itself from them. The 
overview of these matters shows that the activity of the Constitutional Council goes beyond 
the control of the division between competence spheres among the state organs or the ad-
herence to the constitutional rules related to the legislative hierarchy. Its role increases 
steadily in the field of the protection of fundamental rights, further more provides tasks 
similar to the election jurisdiction too. There is no place to appeal again stits decisions. 
As a matter of fact, a separate Chapter of the constitution stipulates on the Constitutional 
Council, which has been amended several times since 1958 — according to the increasing 
role of the Constitutional Council. These amendments should be emphasized separately too: 
these are the modifications enacted in the constitutional acts of 1974 and 1976.14 Largerly 
this development explains that the opinion about the Constitutional Council is not 
getting a uniform or at least unambiguous opinion in the French constitutional law 
literature. "Can we call the Constitutional Council a court ultimately or not? If the answer 
is positive, whether its composition, the guarantees of its impartiality and independence 
are adequate to those conditions which could be justly expected from an organ qualified as 
a court? If the answer is negative, is it to be allowed that an organ which does not receive 
its mandate in the course of the general elections, but comes alive quite direct way, may 
oppose the intentions of those organs which are created in the course of a general 
election..."15 
14 See: „Nyugat-Európa alkotmányai." (The constitutions of Western Europe). Ed. István Ko-
vács, Budapest, 1988. p. 278—280. 
15 Luchaire, Francois: Le Conseil Constitutionnel. Paris, 1980. p. 2. 
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Already this short quotation also proves that in the French legal and administrative 
sciences (including the political literature) even today the great debate is not closed. This 
debate has started — seeking the effective guarantees of constitutionality — almost 200 
years ago, even in the days of revolution. However, it seems that the practice outgrew these 
problems. It is unquestionable that the Constitutional Council of the Vth Republic today 
operates as a constitutional court. The quoted volume by Luchaire provides several evidences 
to this point. It is another question whether a special organ set up for the needs of contempo-
rary times to control the constitutionality can be categorised into any of the three power 
literature However the arguments and doubts related to this sphere can be found in the legal 
branches, of every country. As we already have mentioned, this point supports the views 
saying that these organs cannot be inserted — or just a very arbitrary way — into the clas-
sical system of the division of power branches (which actually operates with three basic types 
of organs). We would rather agree with those ones who seek solution in some other way. 
5. The pre-1945 Hungarian literature of public law regarded to be emphasized: the 
Hungarian constitution which was related to the development of Western European consti-
tutions, had utilized and embraced the most important institutions which were developed 
during the centuries in the Western European — written — constitutions, at the same 
time, however, it had reflelcted the existence of an independent statehood which had operated 
for more than a thousand years. The combination of the traditional, often centuries-old 
public law institutions and the new elements was significantly facilitated by the fact that the 
Hungarian public law before the socialist constitution of 1949 had not recognize the charter-
type constitution. The most important institutions of public law were included in the so-
called fundamental laws (leges cardinales) and basic regulations, which were enacted and 
frequently amended in the different periods of historical development and quite flexibly 
interpreted. Only the 5 month period of the Hungarian Republic of Councils after the First 
World War was an exception, when two charter-type constitutions were adapted (one tem-
porary and one permanent constitution). However, their texts were declared null and 
void by the counter-revolutionary regime, which got into power after the intervention forces 
had defeated the Republic of Councils with the help of the great powers. They hardly left 
any trace in the Hungarian public law between the two world wars. Their influence to a cer-
tain extent was felt in the gradually emerging Hungatian public law ideas after 1945. 
The category of leges cardinales has appeared rather early in the literature of Hungarian 
public law. Every author agrees that these laws limit the royal power. There is such an author 
who tends to seek the creation of the first fundamental law among the decrees of the first 
Hungarian King (Saint Stephen, 1000—1038). According to the author (unknown) of a 
paper published by Elzevir the Irst fundamental law of the Hungarian kingdom was the 
decree which contained the teaching of St. Stephen to his would — be successor about the 
rational rules of practice of state power.16 However the majority of the authors even in this 
age of the Hungarian public law literature have mentioned the Golden Bull of King Andrew 
II made public in 1222 as the first fundamental law of the country.17 The Hungarian Golden 
Bull of 1222 had codified the common law limits against the royal power which emerged at 
the first decade of the XIIIth century and the guarantees against the illegal acts of the king. 
The Article XXXI of this Golden Bull, which has settled the right of armed resistance, had 
served the public law or even more the ideological basis for the national struggles for inde-
pendence during the long centuries. It is true that the Parliament of 1688 formally repealed 
16 See: Respublica et Status Regni Hungariae. Ex officina Elzeviriana. 1634. p. 154 et al. 
17 Among them the first to be mentioned: Gulielmus, Artner: Dissertatio politico-iuridica 
de Regno Hungariae. Tübingen, Anno 1624. Martin Schodel: Disquisitio histórica politica de Regno 
Hungariae. Tübingen, 1629. 
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this Article of the Golden Bull, but the national public opinion has never accepted this 
resolution of the parliament of 1688, namely with the explanation that this resolution has 
been forced upon the nation by the Habsburg king leaning on the assembled army, with the 
threat of armed force. The freedom fight of Rákóczi, which began in 1701 and lasted ten 
years, had referred to this Article when it called the nation to arms against the measures 
which had threatened the independence of the state. We ought to mention that even the 
Hungarian public law literature between the world wars mentioned that Article ("ius resist-
endi") as valid law. So e.g. the university textbook by Kálmán Molnár — discussing the 
guarantees of constitution — defines the freedom fight "as the prevalence of righteous 
defence in the field of constitutional life". According to it: "The fight for freedom is justified 
moreover either in case there is a written rule about it in the Constitution, or not (ius resist-
endi: 1222. XXXI.) Vim vi repellere licet. The nation which does not adhere to its Constitu-
tion and does not possess the determination to protect its threatened Constitution, is not 
mature enough to be free."18 
In the first public law works the role and continuous operation of the parliament as 
one of the most important guarantees of the limitation at the same time of the supervision 
of the royal power is also emphasized. There are some data from the XIIth century about the 
beginning of the feudal assemblies. However, from 1267 the active participation of the 
national assembly of the peers can be documented unambiguously in the legislation. This 
time the Estates of the Realm was named parliament (parlamentum generale sew parlamen-
tum publicum).19 In 1318 the ecclesiastical lords had complained to the Pope that the first 
king from the House of Anjou does not fulfill his duties — his basic duties — to convence 
the parliament. Therefore we can state with justification that at the end of the XIIIth cen-
tury and the beginning of the XIVth century parliament had operated as a recognized and 
consolidated institution of the practice of the central state power. Since — with short and 
never recognized as legal interruptions — it is continuously part of the legislation. The 
"Tripartitum" (Threefold Book) assembled (1514) and published (1518) by Werbőczy, had 
registered the rule that in Hungary the right of legislation is authorized only to the king and 
the nation which assembled in the parliament as a deeply rooted custom of several centuries, 
among the customs which secure "the freedom of the whole Hungarian nation". This is 
referred to the official interpretation of the law too (See: Part II. Article 3. § (3). This rule 
was confirmed later by several written laws too. Among these rules the Act 18 of 1635 is 
mentioned as first. 
The Act I after the crowning of 1608 the parliament consisting of two houses (House 
of Representatives and Upper House) had codified its already existing, non-written — 
common law rules regulating its composition, convening, operation and this way it prevented 
that the king — while manipulating arbitrary way the changes of composition, operational 
order of parliament — influence the activities of parliament. Several laws have declared 
18 See: Kálmán Molnár: "Magyar közjog" (Hungarian public law) 3rd Edition. Danubia, p. 247. 
— The right of resistance was recognized by the post — 1945 literature too, but in somewhat more 
differentiated version compared to the mentioned view of Kálmán Molnár. According to Vilmos 
Szontágh: "The law — if it is adequate to the formal requirements — regardless of its content, — 
demands unconditional obedience, because the law cannot be illegal, however the citizen owes to 
adhere to any other regulation, whether with ruling or with decision content, if it is lawful and final. 
Until it is not final, its lawfulness can be challenged and till that the citizen is not obliged to adhere 
it. If some authoritative organ claims obedience ot its manifest illegality, the citizen — on his own 
responsibility — can resist. It is similar to the freedom fight in the life of the nations." (Comp.: 
"A magyar közjog eleméi" (The elements of constitutional law). — Guideline for the students of the 
worker teaching courses. Debrecen, Tudományegyetemi Nyomda, 1947. p. 30.) 
19 Comp. Csizmadia—Kovács—Asztalos: "Magyar állam és jogtörténet" (The history of Hun-
garian state and law.) 1972. p. 137—138. 
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the obligatory summoning of the parliamant in every three years. The parliament had never 
accepted the infringement of these laws. Every newly summoned parliament had protested 
with a theoretical edge and for reason of maintenance of law if the king had missed the 
three years period. 
From the XIVth and XVth centuries several laws had secured the self-government 
rights of the counties as the territorial organs of nobility. There was a very significant and 
legally recognized public law guarantee that laws and royal decrees should be made public 
in the assemblies of the counties. The counties were obliged to implement only those decrees 
which were in accord with the law. This right of the counties in a certain way had operated 
as a legally recognized collective "ius resistendi". In the second half of the XIXth century the 
•counties have been changed significantly on the basis of the legislation of 1848. They became 
.gradually territorial self-governments organized on the basis of representation. However 
this right of resistence of theirs was further recognized by the public law literature and it was 
regarded as an important constitutional guarantee. It is true although that the Act XXI of 
1886 on the self- government of counties and townships powerfully restricted this right to 
resist. Namely: only those governmental decrees and ministerial orders were taken out of 
the obligation of implementation, which were referring "to such tax-collection, which had 
not been approved yet by the parliament or the actual roll-list of the not approved recruit" 
•(§ 20). In case of other decrees considered illegal, the self-governments were entitled merely 
to the "right of complaint" with delaying validity, but if the decree was repeated by the go-
vernment it should have been implemented (§ 19). 
The government before and after 1848 had possessed quite a few such tools which 
powerfully weakened the practical value of the resistance rights of the counties. For example 
•there was a way to suspend the self-government of a disobedient county and put government 
•commissioner above the county administration. However the circumstance that the counties 
could correspond with each other in nation-wide matters as well made it possible for the 
resisting county to protect itself against isolation. If the county resistance became widspread 
in the whole country, the government was forced to yield sooner or later seeking compro-
mises. E.g. after the Napoleonic wars the Vienna Court supported by the "Holy Alliance" have 
•infringed several times the laws prescribing the obligatory convenance of the parliament 
in every 3 years. The ever growing resistance of the counties, however, after 11 years of 
Interval finnaly forced the convenance of the parliament. The parliament convened in 1823 
has lasted four years. The enacted bills have initiated in Hungary the series of reforms 
in the society, which was finally concluded by the March laws of 1848 eliminating the feudal 
conditions, then the freedom war which has defended these achievements in 1848—1849. 
The Hungarian history literature even today calls this quarter of the century from 1823 till 
1848 "reform age" and the parliamant of this period are named "reform parliaments". 
However, we know some examples about the resistance of the counties at the start of XXth 
century too. In the time of the political crisis of 1905—1906 — when the king has rejected 
the possibility of-marking a cabinet from.the coalition consisting of the opposition of parties 
which gained the majority of votes in the election, and Field Marschal Fejérváry, 
the Captain of the Royal Bodyguards has created a minority government infringing the 
-constitutional rules requiring ministerial approval — the large majority of counties (45 out 
of 63) have rejected obedience and did not implement the governmental measures. In some 
resisting counties so-called constitution-protecting committees were set up and these com-
mittees together with the official organs of the counties have managed the local 
administration.20 
20 About the "resistance of the coűnties" and their political evaluation see: "Magyarország 
története" (The history of Hungary) 1890—1918. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1978. Volume I. 
;P> 549 et al. 
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6. Surveying the historical antecedents we have to say that virtually from 1526 (i.e. 
from the beginning of the Habsburg-seizure of the Hungarian throne) the struggle between 
the royal court seeking absolute power for the king and the parliament representing the 
whole nation became permanent. The overwhelming majority of the parliament was fully 
aware all the time that the recognition of an absolute royal power would actually mean the 
creation of an Austrian—German empire in the Danube Valley and the elimination of the= 
independent Hungarian statehood. 
The struggles against absolutism became armed struggles in the most critical periods. 
These armed uprisings — with a few exceptions — ended in defeat. However the uprisings 
and the passive resistance afterwards made the Vienna Court to realize that it has not 
enough power to create a uniform empire of the Danube Valley. Therefore the uprisings 
were always followed by public law bargainings. In the course of these debates the Court 
once and once again recognized the privileges of the Hungarian nobility, the independence of 
the Hungarian state and the right of the Hungarian nation to be governed according to its 
own laws. We are quite close to the truth by risking the assertion that in Hungary a special 
public law burdened by many compromises are yielded by the lost revolutions and the^ 
following passive national resistance. This is actually true about institutions of the Hunga-
rian constitutional law hich was enacted during the freedom fight of 1848/1849, analoguos 
with the contemporary Western European institutions. It required 18 years after the defeat 
of 1848/1849, to create the compromise between the Dynasty and the nation, which ulti-
mately recognized the validity of the March laws of 1848 and laid down the foundation of 
the independent constitution of Hungary in the framework of Austro^-Hungarian Mo-
narchy which has existed till 1918. 
Among the national uprisings securing the independence of the Hungarian state we 
have to mention the uprising led by István Bocskay (1604—1606) as first. Bocskay had 
gained the alliance of Moravia, and the nobles of Lower and Upper Austria against the 
emperor and king Rudolf, who governed by the tyrannical methods of absolutism. Following, 
the successes of the uprising the Habsburg-family itself has forced Rudolf to resign from 
the throne and cede it to Crown Prince Mathias in these areas and he was later crowned as 
Hungarian king named Mathias II. The public law conditions of the selection of king was 
fixed in 19 laws before the coronation in the course of a long bargaining process. Among: 
others these laws regulate such important public law guarantees as the religious freedom 
of the Protestants (Act 1), the limits of royal power in the field of foreign affairs (The Act II 
had prohibited that the king could start a war without the consent of the parliament or 
bring foreign soldiers in the country). Due to the foreign royal dynasty those public law 
guarantees, which serve the aim that the country should never be without the head of state, 
were particularly important. For the sake of this condition a special law regulated that the-
king should stay as much time as possible in the country, in case of his absence by the 
authorisation given to the Palatine of Hungary he should have such a deputy "who according 
to the ancient customs will rule the country together with the Hungarian Council with the^ 
same full authority and administer it as he himself would reign here" (Act 16.). They have 
taken care that the country always have a palatine who is elected by the nobles and enjoys 
the turst of the country. In case of vacancy in one year period the king was obliged to sum-
mon a parliamentary session selecting the palatine and appoint candidates to this post 
(two Protestant and two Catholics). If the king would miss this obligation, then instead of 
him "with the burden of loss of honesty and position" the Lord of Privy Seal took care 
of the convenance of the palatinate-electing parliament (Act 3.). The Acts 5., 6. and 10. 
regulated the appointment of the Hungarian treasurer, chancellery and counsellors respon-
sible only to the Hungarian king, the palatine and parliament. These laws established such 
important public law guarantees which ruled that the royal crown should be guarded per-
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manently in the country by the responsible personalities elected by the parliament (Act 4.). 
This rule namely excluded the possibility that the king are crowned somewhere outside 
the country. However, the full royal rights were given to the monarch only after the 
coronation. At the occasion of the coronation Mathias II took a solem oath to respect 
the laws of the land. Even the text of this oath was determined by an extra bargaining. 
It is worth to mention that the public law literature of the first decades of the XVIIth century 
regarded the oath of Mathias II such a "pattern" which in case of the so-called mixed i.e. 
government forms mixing the aristocratic and monarchic principle has represented the 
limits of royal power.21 After the coronation further 21 laws regulated some public law 
institutions (among them we have already mentioned the Act I after the coronation of 1608 
about the order of covenance and composition of the parliament). 
The examination of the public law legislature of 1608 proved that in Hungary, actually 
in the same time with the development taking place in the German Empire, the establishment 
of the feudal public law and the codification of its substantial part — regulating the limits 
of the royal power in details — took place. Afterwards, beside the right to resist mainly this 
codified public law became the legal basis of the national struggles against the royal court 
seeking absolutism. Even more so because the new king — while ascending to the throne — 
has been obliged to let him to be crowned, take the coronation oath confirm the coronation 
document which always once again fixed the most significant public law guarantees. This 
codification has greatly contributed to the fact that the coronation oath, the fact of the 
royal crowning itself, and the coronation document (charter) containing the most impor-
tant public law guarantees are among the constitutional guarantees till the coronation of 
the last Hungarian king, Charles IV. (1916). 
After the uprising led by Thököly the Hungarian parliament of 1681 had convened 
in Sopron, repeated and summarized all the accepted public law guarantees of the independ-
ent Hungarian statehood, in this case against the absolutism of Leopold I. After the defeat 
of the mentioned freedom fight led by Ferenc Rákóczi II (1711) the parliament of 1715 has 
ensured not only the umpunity of the participants of the uprising, but withdrew every illegal 
decrees and once again restored the earlier Hungarian public law. 
In Hungary special laws entaced by the Hungarian parliament, which significantly 
differed from those of the hereditary provinces of the House of Habsburg, the Acts I—II of 
1721 and the Act III enacted the right of succession of the female members of the Habsburg 
Dynasty. The first Hungarian queen from the Habsburg House, Maria Theresia was crow-
ned and at that occasion particular fundamental laws guaranteed the independence of 
the country. 
In the development of the Hungarian public law those laws have a peculiar place, which 
were enacted by the parliament of 1790—1791 in order to calm down the uprising which 
almost took place as an answer to the centralisation effort of Joseph II — after the death 
of Joseph II. These laws already were using the public law categories of the French revolution 
— however without eliminating the feudal privileges. The most important of these laws have 
been elevated to the rank of fundamental laws in the deceades before the bourgeois revolution 
and freedom fight of 1848—1849, in the so-called Age of Reforms. The new legal categories 
used by these laws have significantly contributed, to the fact that these laws were approved 
by the revolutionary legislation of 1848 without amendment in several cases and they were 
built in the modernized public law of the revolution. It is possible that these laws had signifi-
cant role in that the work-out of the modern public law built on the equal rights of the citizen 
could be done without the preparation and enactment of a charter-type constitution. There-
21 See: Capitulationes Impretatorum et Regnum. Cum notamentis Johannis Limnaei Argen-
torati. 1651. Sectio IX. 8. p. 32. 
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fore e.g. in Hungary first time in these laws appeared the idea of a constitution of the con-
temporary meaning. The Act X of 1790—1791 while declaring that Hungary is an independ-
ent country with independent existing statehood, mentions that the country possess its 
own constitution. The Act XII on the practice of legislative and executive power (de legisla-
tivae et executivae potestatis exercitio) referring to the separation of power branches, settles 
the basic requirements to be expected from the constitutional state of that age. As far as the 
legislative power is concerned, it repeatedly confirms the concept of the Hungarian public 
law that in Hungary the lawfully elected king and the parliament together are entitled to the 
legislation. A comparatively new rule is the prohibition of the "government by decrees and 
orders". The Act XII of 1790—1791 had permited the appearance of decrees and orders 
"only in accordance with the law", then explicitly mentioned that "the executive power 
is to be exercised by the king in harmony with the law, not otherwise". The same law ruled 
on some important guarantees of the judicial independence. Therefore there was no obstacle 
that the later promulgated Act IV of 1869 on the judicial independence virtually using the 
words of the Act XII of 1790 endowed the judge with the right to supervise the legality of 
decree in the course of his sentencing practice. "The judge is obliged to act according to the 
decrees created and proclaimed on the basis of laws and obliged to act and sentence accor-
ding to the legal customs. He cannot doubt the validity of the regularly proclaimed laws, 
but in the single legal case the judge decided about the legality of the decrees" (Act IV of 
1869 § 19.). 
The public law literature before 1945 had listed the institution of ministerial respon-
sibilityc reated by the Act III of 1848 among the guarantees of constitutionality. Its organi-
sational solutions were mainly similar to the prescription of the Belgian Constitution of 
1831 introducing it to the Hungarian public law. The ministers could be indicted by a simple 
majority resolution of the House of Representatives, the right of jurisdiction belonged to the 
special court created by and consisted of the members of the Upper House. According to 
the universtity textbook Móricz Tomcsányi (1942) titled "The public law of Hungary": 
the actual subject and main reason of the ministerial responsibility is the infringement of the 
constitution, when the minister as the applier of executive power infringes the constitution it-
self directly" (p. 503). After 1945 the institution of the ministerial responsibility — according 
to the conditions of the single house-parliament—has been modified. The Act I of 1946 (The 
so-called Republic Act) actually by referring the Act III of 1848 has determined the possi-
bility of calling even the president of the republic to responsibility. The special institution 
of ministerial responsibility was maintained in the § 27 of the Constitution of 1949, which 
has ruled that the mode of responsibility procedures should be regulated by a special law. 
Such law never was created. However, even after 1949 such opinion has existed that after 
the enactment of the Constitution of 1949 some rules of the Act III of 1848 should be handled 
as valid law. 
Only in the last years of the XIXth century and in the first decade of the XXth century 
the debates about the so-called public law jurisdiction got settled. Threefold ideas competed 
with each other. The first one referring to the example of the Anglo-Saxon institutions, 
intended to construct the whole public law jurisdiction on the system of regular courts, the 
second idea intended to give a multi-grade, specially system of administrative courts the right 
to judge over the so-called disputed public law cases, the third concept operated instead 
of the disputed public law matters with a narrower category of the so-called constitutional 
guarantees, it wanted to authorize a separated "state court" to control the prevalence of the 
constitutional guarantees. In this latter sphere of subjects a separate draft law was created 
with quite detailed explanation.22 In the elaboration and explantation of this draft the 
22 See Dr. Imre, Szivák: "Az alkotmányi biztosítékokról" (On the constitutional guarantees.) 
Budapest, 1906. p. 175. 
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concept comes out clearly that in the supervision of constitutional guarantees only a 
certain special organisational form could mean "a satisfactory organisational guarantee" 
(Ibid p. 80.). Finally the so-called state court — which is similar to the constitutional court — 
was not created at all. 
In 1896 a single-grade public administration court was created, separately from the 
regular courts, organized to deal with matters defined by the law, namely the Act XXVI of 
1896. Its competence sphere was extended by several supplementary laws later to the field 
of constitutional guarantees too. E.g. the Act LX of 1907 has authorized it to repeal minis-
terial decrees in case some county-level selfgovernment considers these decrees as infringe-
ment of its self-government rights and files a complaint to the court. The Act LXI of 1907 
has created the competence court as another kind of public law court. 
This system of public law jurisdiction has not been changed till the elimination of the pub-
lic law courts. However during the years after the Second World War many followers in the 
public law literature supported the view which intended to develop further or reform the 
public law jurisdiction according to the Anglo-Saxon patterns starting from this point 
of the unity of judicial power.23 
7. Today we can state unambiguously that the charter-like constitution enacted in 1949 
belongs to the group of those constitutions, which can be rather considered political pro-
grams than legal documents. Even the legal guarantees of its practical implementation were 
absent. In this matter it hardly differed from the earlier socialist constitutions. Here we mean 
not merely the Stalinist constitution of 1936 or the popular democratic constitutions which 
followed this model. The truth is that already in the time of preparation and enactment of 
the first Soviet constitution it was rather problematic, whether the socialist revolution is 
compatible to a written constitution at all. E.g. I. P. Stuchka, who was Commissar of Justice 
in 1918 (later he became an author in constitutional law) has powerfully doubted that the 
Soviet state while fulfilling the dictatorship of the proletariate needs a written constitution 
at all. "Even such a famous state leader and well-known jurist as I. P. Stuchka, who was 
Commissar of Justice in 1918, has doubted the necessity of preparing a constitution. Mista-
kenly he has thought that the transfer form capitalism to communism cannot be inserted 
"into the framework of written fundamental law" and the dictatorship of the proletariate 
"would hardly harmonize with such words as written law" — we can read this view in a latest 
work on the history of Soviet constitution.24 We may say that this opinion of Stuchka was 
not given up even after the enactment of the 1918 and 1924 constitutions either. He held the 
opinion that the rules of constitution among the conditions of the dictatorship of the proleta-
riate are not legal regulations, but such "organisational norms", which virtually "repre-
sent" — openly express — the working methods of the Soviet power in the exercise of 
political authority. Actually he has the same view in his book titled "Concept on the 
state of the proletariate and peasantry and its constitution" published in 1926.25 Some 
traces of this view can be found even after the death of Stalin and even the XXth Congress 
of the Soviet Communist Party. We can find such views in the socialist constitutional law 
literature too, which regarded a special method of constitutional law regulation the elimi-
nation of legal sanctions, referring to the fact that in such aspect the adaptation of certain 
legal concepts in the constitution means guarantee by itself for the implementation.26 
23 See: József, Szabó: "Demokrácia és közjogi bíráskodás" (Democracy and public law juris-
diction.) Budapest, 1946. p. 247. 
24 Comp. J. S. Kukuskhin—O. I. Chistiakov: Ocherk istorii sovietskoi konstitutsii. Moscow, 
Izd. Pol. Lit. 1987. p. 11. 
25 Uchennie o gossudarstva proletariata i kresstianstva i ego konstitutsii. SSSR — RSFSR 
Izd. r. Moscow, 1926. p. 291. 
26 See: V. F. Kotok: "A szovjet államjog tárgya" (The subject of Soviet public law.) In: "A szov-
jet államjog kérdései" (The questions of Soviet public law.) Budapest, 1962. Akadémiai Kiadó, p. 64. 
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The lack of legal guarantees of the implementation has significantly obstructed the 
implementation of the constitutional regulations. Although the § 70 of the constitution 
ruled that "the Council of Ministers is obliged to submit the draft of the law regulations 
required for the implementation of the Constitution", but there was no measure taken about 
the deadline. Therefore in some cases long years went by till each institution prescribed by 
the Constitution was implemented in practice. Even later there were some rules in the Consti-
tution which did not become reality due to the lack of the proper executive orders. This can 
be said not only about the basic rights of the citizens, but such institutions as the plebiscite, 
for example. It came out only in the last months that actually the Constitution regulates 
the possibility of the prebiscite, however for the arrangement of plebiscite the detailed law 
regulation is indispensable with the rules of procedure as well. But that was missing 
completely. 
A part of the constitutional guarantees were repealed already in the time of preparation 
of the Constitution while arguing that instead of them new type institutions will be applied 
introduced by the new constitution. For example in the first months of 1949 they abolished 
the Administrative Court saying the argument that the legality control of public adminis-
trative activities will be done by the new type public prosecutor's office. However the new 
type prosecution was established only in 1953. 
The Constitution became valid in the same time with its proclamation, i.e. in August 
1949. In the state practice that view prevailed that the enactment of the new constitution 
automatically (without creating implementation regulations) repeals the constitutional 
guarantees fixed by the earlier public law regulations. Consequently in the absence of the 
appropriate law rules the legal framework of important constitutional institutions became 
uncertain. We can mention the ministerial responsibility, the organisational guarantees of 
judicial independence, the separation of public administration and jurisdiction, the compe-
tence division between the representative and administrative organs as examples. All of this 
explains that in the first years after the implementation of the new Constitution prima-
rily not the creation of constitutional guarantees, but the implementation of the valid 
constitution stood in the foreground. 
After the death of Stalin, the political line appearing in June 1953 put the realization 
of the Constitution, the practical implementation of its expressed democratic achievements 
on its banner. 
"The government in its whole operation stands on the basis of legal order and legality 
established by the Constitution. The basis of our popular democratic state system, economic 
and social life is the socialist legality, the strict adherence to the rights and duties of the 
citiziens prescribed by the Constitution and the laws of our People's Republic". 
One can read this text in the program of the newly elected Parliament, as it was told at 
the session of June 1953.27 
In the course of the continuous realization of the program of the new government 
in the research of legal and administrative sciences the problems related to the constitutio-
nality and legality of legislation acquired the main importance. Even more so because parallel 
with the enactment of the new Constitution those rules of the earlier judicial organisational 
laws were repealed which authorized the judges to examine the legality of the public admi-
nistrative decrees to be applied in their cases. 
At the occasion of the public session of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (May 1954) in 
the plenary session framework of the Academy a special conference dealt with the theoretical 
27 See in details: István, Kovács: "Népköztársaságunk alkotmányának következetes végrehajt 
tásával a júniusi párthatározatok megvalósításáért" (Through the consequent implementation of 
the Constitution of our People's. Republic for the accomplishment of the Party decisions of june. 
Állam- és Igazgatás, July—August, 1953. p. 337—353. 
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problems of legislation. In this conference the whole problematics of the constitutionality 
and legality of written law, its formal and material aspects were examined. The formal 
aspect of legislation did not mean merely the proclamation and appearance of the legal 
regulations, but the whole mechanism of the preparation of laws and the too much divided 
hierarchical system of laws as well. 
Even that claim was heard that once again that basic rule should be applied that the 
original legislation can be built only on ads and their supervision should be ensured.28 
The results of scientific research partly were used by the Law Decree 26 of 1954 imple-
menting the constitutional rules (about the proclamation and promulgation of legal regula-
tions) and the Decree of the Council of Ministers 1072/1954 about the implementation 
details. The Law Decree and the Decree of the Council of Ministers orders even some 
sanctions in case of infringement of the constitutional guarantees expressed in the new 
regulations. Namely it calls the attention of the Secretariate of the Government to pay 
attention to the work of legislative activity of the organs subjected to the Council of Minis-
ters and in case of infrigement of guarantees expressed in the Decree of the Council of 
Ministers it should initiate at the government "the elimination of the fault" (Decree of the 
Council of Ministers 1072/1954, Art. 26). 
This "organisational" solution which should be taken only as initial step forward at 
most certainly could not satisfy the increased expectations then. However, the next step 
was taken much later. Only after 1956 the emphasis on the legal character of the Constitution 
and the strengthening of the constitutionality of legislature gained ground once again.29 
The book by Lajos Szamel, titled "Legal Sources" (1958), searching for the socialist traditions 
of constitutionality and the legality of legislation already called attention to the fact that 
in the framework of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union the so-called "konstitutionnaya 
kommissiya", which has operated between 1924 and 1930, has acted as a special constitutional 
court and had quite wide competence sphere. Imre Szabó in his essay, titled "The place of 
the Constitution in our popular democratic system" has examined the legal character of the 
Constitution and the chances of progress of the guarantees which were to consolidate the 
legal character of the constitution.30 Ottó Bihari called the attention to the organisational 
guarantees of the constitutionality and the legality of legislation. He has proposed to author-
ize the Law Committee of the Parliament to examine especially the constitutionality of law 
decrees issued by the Presidential Council of the People's Republic.31 Other proposals 
require the creation of special institutions (primarily in the framework of the Parliament as 
the more effective guarantees of the constitutionality of legislation.)32 From the literature 
of this time dealing with the control of constitutionality the book by Kornél Pikler, titled 
"The bourgeois constitutional jurisdiction" deserves special attention (Budapest, 1965. 
p. 286). The book, while satisfying the ideological rituale of that age, criticize the Western 
institutions, however the claim comes out undoubtedly that we should seek the possibilities 
28 See: "MT Társadalmi-történeti osztályának közleményei" (The Publications of the Social 
and Historical Sciences Department of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) (MTA) Volume V. 
Nr. 14. The new period and the theoretical questions of legislature, p. 215—267. — Following the 
session several essays dealt with the constututionality of the law sources system living in the practice 
too. Among them one should be mentioned particularly : the paper by Lajos, Szamel: "A jogforrá-
sokról és közzétételükről" (On the legal sources and their announcement.) See: Jogtudományi Köz-
löny, 1954. Nr. 10. p. 442—552. 
29 Lajos, Szamel: "Jogforrások" (Legal sources). Budapest, 1958. p. 182. 
30 Jogtudományi Közlöny, October—November, 1959. p. 497—515. 
31 See : Ottó Bihari: "Alkotmány és törvényesség" (Constitution and legality). Jogtudományi 
Közlöny, 1960. Nr. 10. p. 513—519. 
32 See: István, Kovács: "A szocialista alkotmányfejlődés új elemei." (The new elements of the 
socialist constitutional development.) Budapest, 1962. p. 392 et al. 
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of the institutional development while analyzing the experiences of Western institutions. 
(See. Ibid Closing remarks, p. 259 et al.) 
In the sixties the preparative activities of the general revision of the Constitution, the 
preparation of a new Constitution have started. In the course of this work concrete proposals 
were taking shape too. Namely: in the organisation of the Parliament a special committee 
should be established to control the constitutionality, largerly with the organisation and 
competence which later belonged to the Constitutional Law Council. The text of one of these 
drafts was published in the volume titled "The development of the Constitution of the 
Hungarian People's Republic" by István Kovács (The publication of the Institute for Legal 
and Administrative Sciences MTA Volume I. p. 346—347.) 
In the course of the formulation of the constitutional amendment, however, this question 
was taken off the agenda. According to the argument it is enough that the text of the Consti-
tution prescribes that one of the most important tasks of the Parliament is the supervision 
of the constitutional order of the society. Accordingly, the modified statutes of the Parliament 
will make arrangements about the creation of a special council which will controll the consti-
tutionality. Therefore the special council serving the control of constitutionality did not get 
into the text of the amended Constitution modified by the Act I of 1972. Then in the course 
of the modification of the statutes of the Parliament such decision was taken that there is no 
need to have such a council at all. It was satisfactory if the modified statutes reminded 
already existing permanent committees of the Parliament that in their own competence 
they should do the tasks related to the supervision of constitutionality. 
8. Afterwards more than ten years went by before the proposal of the Constitutional 
Law Council became reality. Finally the establishment of the Constitutional Law Council 
was ordered by the amendment of the Constitution, the Act of 1983. The basic regulations 
concerning the Constitutional Law Council were included in the modified § 21 of the Consti-
tution. Consequently: "The Parliament selects the Constitutional Law Council, which 
controls the constitutionality of legal rules and quidelines. It can suspend the implementation 
of those regulations, which contradict the Constitution — with the exception of legal rules 
established by the Parliament and the Presidential Council and the quidelines and principles 
of the Supreme Court (Art 3). Everybody is obliged to make available those data which are 
requested by the parliamentary committees and the Constitutional Law Council and obliged 
to testify in front of them." (Art 4) The detailed regulations concerning the Constitutional 
Law Council were prescribed by the Act I of 1984. on the Constitutional Law Council (The 
rules of its operation were contained by the modified statutes of the Parliament). According 
to the Act I of 1984 the Constitutional Law Council may have 11—17 members. Its president, 
secretary and the majority of its members should be elected from the representatives of the 
Parliament, the other members may be selected from other personalities of public life. 
Among them the experts and professors of constitutional law got their place. In its sessions 
the Minister of Justice, the President of the Central Bureau of People's Supervision, the 
President of the Supreme Court and the Highest Prosecutor take part ex officio — with right 
to enter the debate. However, its authorisation is continuous in the meaning that it is termi-
nated only by the election of the new Constitutional Law Council. Its procedure can be 
initiated by the Council or its members, furthermore the state and social organs mentioned 
by the law. The Constitutional Law Council has started its activities in 1984. We have to say 
that its work developed among considerable difficulties. This fact can be explained by 
several causes, among others it is due to the fact that the law has relatively restricted the 
sphere of the state and social organs which may initiate procedures, did not emphasize the 
independence of the Constitutional Law Council in the interpretation of the Constitution, 
did not ensure an independent staff for it etc. However, we have to mention that despite the 
difficulties the Constitutional Law Council adapted several important resolutions. It sus-. 
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pended some objectionable law regulation and even more frequently used its right to deter-
mine a proper deadline for the competent organ to correct the regulation which infringed 
the Constitution. In the course of the planned reform of the political system and the activities 
of the preparation of the new Constitution it became clear that the organisational and com-
petence frameworks of the Constitutional Law Council — regardless of the activities of the 
Council — did not comply with the control of constitutionality. Therefore such a new, 
independent, actually judicial-type organ is needed — i.e. Constitutional Court — which 
possess much wider competence than the Constitutional Law Council in order to ensure 
the legality of legislation. Furthermore it can be authorized with such rights which go beyond 
the supervision of the legality of the legislation and generally serve the consolidation of the 
constitutionál guarantees. 
The establishment of the Constitutional Court has been ordered by the Act I of 1989 
enacted in January 10, 1989. The general constitutional amendment of October 18, 1989 
(Act XXXI of 1989) has modified it in some places and has summarized the constitutional 
fundamental principles related to the Constitutional Court into a separate chapter of the 
Constitution (Chapter IV) and left to an Act with constituonal force to establish the detailed 
regulations concerning the Constitutional Court. The constitutional basic principles related to 
the Constitutional Court are the following: a) the Constitutional Court supervises the 
constitutionality of the laws. As an Act or any other law regulation is considered to be 
unconstitutional, it will nullify it. b) beyond the supervision of the constitutionality of legal 
regulations the law may delegate other tasks to the competence sphere of the Constitutional 
Court too. c) anybody may initiate the procedure of the Constitutional Court, d) its 15 
members are elected by the representatives of the Parliament with two-third majority, 
e) the members of the Constitutional Court cannot be members of any party and may 
conduct only such political activities which are placed in the sphere of tasks to be done by 
the Constitutional Court. 
The Parliament enacted the Act regulating the Constitutional Court in October 19,1989 
(No. XXXII. of 1989), which became valid in the day of its proclamation (October 30, 
1989). At the same time the Constitutional Law Council ceased to exist, the cases under 
way will be decided by the Constitutional Court (§ 58). The seat of the Constitutional Court 
is Esztergom. It started its operations at January 1, 1990. The provisional regulations of 
the law include that the recent Parliament elects only 5 members of the Constitutional Court, 
further 5 members will be elected by the newly elected Parliament in 2 months from its 
initial session, the remaining five seats will be filled only after five years. 
The Constitutional Court elects its President and Deputy President among its own 
members. Until the Constitutional Court consists of only five members, it elects only a 
Deputy President and he will fulfill the tasks of the President too. Furthermore, the 5 member 
Constitutional Court also may practice the whole competence sphere of the Constitutional 
Court. This competence is rather widespread. Namely, according to the § 1 of the Act the 
competence sphere of the Constitutional Court includes a) preliminary examination of the 
law drafts, the enacted, but not yet proclaimed laws, the statutes of the Parliament and 
unconstitutionality of some rules of international agreement; b) the posterior examination 
of the unconstitutionality of the law regulation and any other legal measure of the of nor-
mative character other than legal rules; c) the examination of collision of law or any other 
legal measure with international agreement; d) the judgement on constitutional law 
complaint which was submitted against an infringement of laws ensured by the Constitution; 
e) the elimination of unconstitutionality appearing in omission; f) the elimination of 
competence disputes between the state organs, furthermore between the self-govern-
ment and the state organs, and between the self-governments; g) the interpretation of the 
constitutional regulations; h) procedure in all of those matters which are referred by law 
to its competence. 
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